	Case 2:17-cr-00585-GMS Doci	ument 104 Filed 12/29/17 Page 1 of 4	
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	ELIZABETH A. STRANGE First Assistant United States Attor District of Arizona MATTHEW BINFORD Arizona State Bar No. 029019 <u>Matthew.Binford@usdoj.gov</u> CAROLINA ESCALANTE Arizona State Bar No. 026233 <u>Fernanda.Escalante.Konti@usdoj.</u> GARY M. RESTAINO Arizona State Bar No. 017450 <u>Gary.Restaino@usdoj.gov</u> Assistant U.S. Attorneys 40 N. Central Ave., Suite 1800 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 Telephone: 602-514-7500		
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11	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
12	FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA		
13	United States of America,	CR-17-00585-PHX-GMS	
14	Plaintiff,	UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO	
15	V.	DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR THE RETURN OF PROPERTY PURSUANT TO	
16	Thomas Mario Costanzo,	FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) (CR 95)	
17	Defendant.		
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18 19	Defendant Costanzo seeks	the return of property seized from him at or shortly after	
		the return of property seized from him at or shortly after lly on his interest in the 80.94512167 bitcoins <sup>1</sup> which he	
19	his arrest, and he focuses specifica		
19 20 21	his arrest, and he focuses specifica exchanged with undercover agents	lly on his interest in the 80.94512167 bitcoins <sup>1</sup> which he	
19 20 21 22	his arrest, and he focuses specifica exchanged with undercover agents	lly on his interest in the 80.94512167 bitcoins <sup>1</sup> which he s for purported drug money. Because these bitcoins are in the criminal indictment, the equitable remedy of	
19 20 21 22 23	his arrest, and he focuses specifica exchanged with undercover agents part of the forfeiture allegation Rule 41(g) is unavailable to defen	lly on his interest in the 80.94512167 bitcoins <sup>1</sup> which he s for purported drug money. Because these bitcoins are in the criminal indictment, the equitable remedy of	
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19 20	his arrest, and he focuses specificate exchanged with undercover agents part of the forfeiture allegation Rule 41(g) is unavailable to defen Defendant more specifically money transmittal counts, the gov	Illy on his interest in the 80.94512167 bitcoins <sup>1</sup> which he is for purported drug money. Because these bitcoins are in the criminal indictment, the equitable remedy of dant.	
<ol> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> </ol>	his arrest, and he focuses specificate exchanged with undercover agents part of the forfeiture allegation Rule 41(g) is unavailable to defen Defendant more specifically money transmittal counts, the gov	Illy on his interest in the 80.94512167 bitcoins <sup>1</sup> which he is for purported drug money. Because these bitcoins are in the criminal indictment, the equitable remedy of dant. In the contends that because the government dismissed the ernment has no basis to forfeit all of the seized bitcoins	

1 transmitted the bitcoins to the undercover agent on April 20, 2017, in exchange for 2 \$107,000 of currency represented to be drug proceeds. See Superseding Indictment 3 (CR 18), at Count 7 and Forfeiture Allegation; see also Bill of Particulars (CR 46, at 9). It 4 is black letter law in this Circuit that the existence of civil or criminal forfeiture proceedings 5 precludes the return of property under Rule 41(g), or its predecessor, Rule 41(e). E.g., 6 United States v. Fitzen, 80 F.3d 387, 389 (9th Cir. 1996) (as to forfeiture generally); United 7 States v. \$83,310.78 in U.S. Currency, 851 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1988) (as to civil 8 forfeiture); United States v. Cobb, 2015 WL 518548 at \* 5 (D. Nev. 2015) (as to forfeiture 9 alleged in an indictment); United States v. Wetselaar, 2013 WL 8206582 at \* 18 (D. Nev. 10 2013) (same). See also United States v. Tahir, 2016 WL 641342 at \*6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 11 18, 2016) (because the government filed a Bill of Particulars specifically identifying a 12 Rolex watch as part of the criminal forfeiture, defendant cannot obtain relief under Rule 13 41(g)).

14 Defendant's argument is also premised on a faulty conclusion, that forfeiture of the 15 "clean" asset exchanged for the dirty money is somehow limited to the value at the time of 16 the transaction. The United States' interest in the bitcoins exchanged for dirty cash vested 17 immediately at the time of the offense. Put another way, any commodity, currency or other 18 type of property acquired in laundering the dirty money, including the subsequent 19 appreciation in value, belongs to the United States. Case law in other jurisdictions clearly 20 supports the government's position. E.g., United States v. Nektalov, 461 F.3d 309, 319 21 (2nd Cir. 2006) (as to diamonds exchanged for dirty money); United States v. Betancourt, 22 422 F.3d 240, 251 (5th Cir. 2005) (as to a winning lottery ticket purchased with drug 23 proceeds). The government has not found any Ninth Circuit cases directly on point, but a 24 tracing case supports its position. In particular, the Ninth Circuit has held that where a 25 defendant engages in a subsequent transaction partially with laundered funds and partially 26 with untainted funds, the defendant's interest in the increased value is limited to the 27 percentage of "clean" funds in the overall purchase price. See United States v. Real

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Property Located at 22 Santa Barbara Dr., 264 F.3d 860, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2001) (assuming that 28% of the purchase price was made with untainted funds, and therefore holding that the government was entitled to at least 72% of the gain in value). This is of course not a 4 tracing case, and no authority supports apportionment here. Moreover, forfeiture of the 5 entirety of the thing of value being exchanged tracks the statutory language in 18 U.S.C. 6 § 982 (requiring the forfeiture to the United States of any property, real or personal, "involved in" a money laundering offense) which is in turn tracked by the language of the 7 8 Superseding Indictment. The Court should deny relief under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g).

9 The government nonetheless recognizes that the value of the seized bitcoins has fluctuated significantly and risen generally since the seizure. Although the government 10 11 would oppose any return of property to defendant at this stage of the case, the government 12 is willing to discuss with defendant (and the other third party claimant with a stake in the 13 bitcoins at issue) the possibility of moving the Court for an order authorizing an interlocutory sale, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(7) and consistent with the norms 14 and practices of the United States Marshals Service as the custodian of the asset,<sup>2</sup> in order 15 16 to preserve the status quo.

Respectfully submitted this 29th day of December, 2017.

ELIZABETH A. STRANGE First Assistant United States Attorney District of Arizona

s/ Gary Restaino MATTHEW BINFORD CAROLINA ESCALANTE GARY M. RESTAINO Assistant U.S. Attorneys

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<sup>2</sup> Generally speaking, the standard practice on disposition of bitcoins, whether post-forfeiture or on an interlocutory basis, is through the use of an auction on a periodic basis. The Marshals Service does not use commercial exchanges when selling seized bitcoins.

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2	I hereby certify that on December 29, 2017, I electronically transmitted the attached
3	document to the Clerk's Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a
4	Notice of Electronic Filing to all counsel of record.
5	
6	s/Lauren M. Routen
7	Legal Assistant U.S. Attorney's Office
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